Social media have great potential to support diverse information sharing, but there is widespread concern that platforms like Twitter do not result in communication between those who hold contradictory viewpoints. Because users can choose whom to follow, prior research suggests that social media users exist in "echo chambers" or become polarized. We seek evidence of this in a complete cross section of hyperlinks posted on Twitter, using previously validated measures of the political slant of news sources to study information diversity. Contrary to prediction, we find that the average account posts links to more politically moderate news sources than the ones they receive in their own feed. However, members of a tiny network core do exhibit crosssectional evidence of polarization and are responsible for the majority of tweets received overall due to their popularity and activity, which could explain the widespread perception of polarization on social media.
INTRODUCTION
Because anyone can post and re-share content, social media has been connected to increased participation and diversity of expression, raising hopes for a role for social media in promoting innovation, building social capital and empowering workers within firms and in society in general Bertot, et al., 2010; Kane et. al, 2009; Woodly, 2008) . Given the opportunities available in big data and the imperative to make use of them (LaValle, et al, 2013) , business leaders have turned in increasing numbers to analyzing social media data in order to learn from customers (Culnan, McHugh, and Zubillaga, 2010; He, Zha and Li, 2013; Chen, Chiang, and Storey, 2012) , and computer scientists have developed many tools to help achieve these ends (see e.g. Pang and Lee, 2008) . Firms have also adopted internal social networking platforms in great numbers. Yammer, a popular enterprise social networking platform, claims to be used by more than 500,000 firms, including 85% of the Fortune 500 (Yammer, 2015) .
It is easy to see why many see social media as potentially valuable external sources and internal conduits of diverse knowledge (Kane, Majchrzak and Ives, 2010) . Innovation has long been seen as deriving from recombining diverse ideas (Schumpeter, 1934) , and diverse ideas are assumed to flow through diverse networks (Hampton, Lee, and Her, 2011) like those created by connecting a diverse user base via social media. In general, diversity among individuals is thought to lead to better performance in solving problems (Hong and Page, 2004) and modern crowdsourcing approaches to innovation would seem to thrive on the fuel of diversity (Jeppesen and Lakhani, 2010) . important and active nodes, surrounded by a larger, less densely connected periphery (Borgatti and Everett, 2000; Fredriksen, 2012, Wu, et al., 2011) .
By focusing on highly active users, prior research on the phenomena of echo chambers and polarization has arguably only emphasized the study of the network core, whose behavior is not representative of the average user of the platform (Adamic and Glance, 2005; Conover, et al, 2011; Bakshy, Messing and Adamic, 2015) . Moreover, it could even be argued that by constructing their data sets by including only those individuals with clear partisan affiliation (Adamic and Glance, 2005; Bakshy, Messing and Adamic, 2015) , or those who posted about politically divisive topics (Conover, et al., 2011; Barbera et al., 2015) , prior research studied only users prone to political division and therefore sheds little light on the nature of social media in general. Due to its traditional survey methodology, Hampton, et al. (2014) does not have this limitation but on the other hand it also cannot answer those questions which would require largescale network data as evidence.
Here, we seek to reconcile the differing perspectives on patterns of diversity in social media with a study of a complete cross-section of Twitter posts ("tweets") of hyperlinks, together with the associated follower network data. Our data set includes 15 million unique URLs posted by 2.7 million users based on a 300 hour data set, representing a complete record of all such activity on Twitter during the collection period. We test hypotheses implied by prior research as well as characterize the overall structure of the Twitter follower network with respect to ideological diversity. Rather than echo chambers or cross-sectional evidence of polarization, we find that, on average, Twitter accounts post links to more politically moderate (but not necessarily centrist) news sources than the links they receive in their own feed. Members of a tiny but highly followed network core behave differently from the typical user, however, and post links to sources that are more politically extreme than what they receive in their own newsfeeds. While our empirical setting is political slant, we believe that the implications go beyond this narrow application and provide a basis for understanding the structure of selforganization in social media more generally.
THEORIES OF INFORMATION DIVERSITY ON SOCIAL MEDIA
No one can read every article or interact with every user on the internet; instead, internet users must make choices about where to direct their attention. Given the human tendency toward homophily (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001 ) and confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998) , social media users are likely to follow other users whose opinions are similar to their own. At the extreme, this could lead to fragmentation of users into ideologically narrow groups, in which people are only exposed to information that confirms their previously-held opinions (Van Alstyne and Brynjolffson, 2005; Burt, 2004) . We refer to this as the "echo chambers" theory of social media. Empirical studies have confirmed some of these fears: there is a tendency for blogs with the same political and ideological inclination to link to each other (Adamic and Glance, 2005; Conover, et al, 2011; Hargittai, Gallo and Kane, 2008 ) and a tendency of readers to engage with content aligned with their ideological preferences (Lawrence, Sides and Farrell, 2010) .
Homophilous behavior is then magnified by algorithmic information filters on certain social media sites such as Facebook (Bakshy, Messing and Adamic, 2015; Lazer, 2015) .
A related view says that homophily may not lead people to be disconnected and ignorant of opposing views, as echo chambers theory would have it. Instead, the relationship between groups of connected individuals may be mutually aware and antagonistic. Sunstein (2002 Sunstein ( , 2008 argues that when like-minded individuals discuss a controversial topic, there is a tendency for them to adopt an even more extreme position on that topic than they initially held. Barbera et al. (2015) document this process unfolding over time in partisan debate of controversial issues on Twitter. Conover et al. (2011) show that while people follow and retweet 1 like-minded others on Twitter, they mention 2 users they disagree with in the context of argument and other negative commentary, illustrating that separate groups are antagonistic, not ignorant of each other. We refer to this as the "polarization" theory of social media.
Despite all of this evidence, however, the idea that social media users segregate themselves into homogenous or polarized communities is far from an established fact. Some have theorized that while social network ties may tend to be formed among similar others, there are many dimensions along which that similarity may be manifest (Watts, Dodds, and Newman, 2002 ) and social media users may be connected not only to people with whom they agree politically, but also to people with whom they share other similarities, such as workplace, alma mater and so on. This phenomenon of simultaneous contact with people from different contexts has been called "context collapse" and can lead users to limit their expression of potentially controversial beliefs (Marwick and boyd, 2010 ; see also Bernstein (2012) for a similar finding in an organizational context). Centola and Macy (2007) argue that certain phenomena -including potentially controversial expressions such as political beliefs -are most likely to occur and exert influence in the context of a highly clustered network such that there is the possibility of receiving multiple reinforcing signals from one's network neighbors. Finally, these recent theories echo the pre-internet theory of public opinion that people tend to articulate what they perceive to be the mainstream point of view or withhold their voice entirely, creating a "spiral of silence" for minority viewpoints (Noelle-Neumann, 1974) . Collectively, we refer to these ideas as the "mainstreaming" theory of social media.
There is empirical support for the mainstreaming narrative of social media use as well.
On average, it has been found that people are much less likely to discuss controversial topics on social media than in private (Hampton et al. 2014) . For political hashtags on Twitter, repeated exposures are important precursors to an individual's adoption of those hashtags in their own posts (Romero, Meeder and Kleinberg, 2011) , which could be interpreted as seeking repeated confirmation from their community before sharing something potentially controversial.
Our primary goal is to consider evidence for and against the theories of echo chambers, polarization, and mainstreaming. In this and the following sections, we therefore ask what we would expect to find in a complete cross-section of Twitter posts if the above theories were in fact true. We articulate a number of detailed hypotheses to test on this basis, but our overarching questions are simply whether Twitter shows evidence of (1) echo chambers (2) polarization and (3) mainstreaming.
Echo Chambers and polarization
For our purposes, what cross-sectional observations would be consistent with echo chambers and polarization? First, we expect to find homophily. In other words, we would expect the typical Twitter user to tweet links to news sources with similar political slant to the slant of the content they receive from the people they follow: we expect followers and followees to tweet at a similar level of political slant (we define how we measure slant below). Sunstein (2002 Sunstein ( , 2008 argues that when like-minded individuals are connected, the views they express can be more extreme than what they would have expressed prior to deliberation, in part because of social pressure toward conformity. He refers to this phenomenon as polarization.
If Twitter accounts are not just homophilous but also polarized, it would suggest that they tweet at more extreme levels of slant than the information they receive in their news feeds.
Hypothesis 1c: The mean political slant of news sources in tweets by individuals is more extreme than the mean political slant of the tweets that they receive from the people they follow.
Alternatively, rather than treating the individual as the unit of analysis, we could treat network ties as the unit of analysis. In this case, we expect to see ties (follower-followee relationships) between people who tweet links to content with similar political slant. In other words, in social network terminology, we expect "assortativity" -a correlation between the presence of network ties and similarity on some attribute (Newman, 2003) -based on political slant. (Granovetter, 1973; Hansen, 1999; Burt, 2004) . Moreover, people are more likely to strongly influence one another within, rather than between, clusters of ties (Centola, 2010) . As a result, we would expect people within dense clusters to be more politically similar to each other than people who are not in highly clustered network positions.
Hypothesis 4: The greater the clustering around an individual, the stronger the correlation between the political slant in their own tweets and the political slant in the tweets they receive from the people they follow.
Mainstreaming Theory
What observations would constitute evidence of mainstreaming behavior? The spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1974 ) and context collapse (Marwick and boyd, 2010 ) describe a tendency for people to withhold opinions that they think are not in accordance with the mainstream or potentially offensive. Therefore, most basically, we would expect to observe more "silent reading" at less centrist levels of slant. That is, if people exhibit mainstreaming behavior, more people would choose to read tweets, but not post tweets themselves, the further away they were from the political center.
We test for silent reading in two ways. First, we simply ask if more centrist individuals post more tweets than less centrist individuals. 
Beyond average behavior: macroscopic and subnetwork analyses
The above hypotheses are specified in microscopic terms, in that we treat individuals and network dyads as the units of analysis, and will be tested on the entirety of link-posting behavior on Twitter during the study period. These hypothesis tests serve our theoretical questions and provide the foundation of our empirical analysis.
To paint a fuller picture, however, and to better connect our work with prior research on social media, we also include a series of analyses that take other perspectives on the data. In particular, scholars of online communities have been concerned with their macroscopic coreperiphery structure (Dahlander and Fredriksen, 2012; Collier and Kraut, 2012; Wasko, Teigland and Faraj, 2009 ), which Wu, et al. (2011) have demonstrated also describes Twitter networks. In a classic core-periphery structure, the network core is a set of nodes (individuals) that tend to be connected to each other; the periphery is a (typically larger) set of nodes that tend to be connected to nodes in the core, but not to each other (Borgatti and Everett, 1999) . In the setting of Twitter, this is to say that there is a set of highly-followed accounts (the core) that tend to follow each other; more typical users (the periphery) follow members of the core, but are less likely to follow other typical users.
Analyses of macroscopic structure
Members of the news-sharing core differ from other users with respect to their network position; it is possible that they also differ from other users in terms of the correlation between incoming slant and outgoing slant. To check for this possibility, we repeat a basic analysis of the correlation between incoming and outgoing slant on two subgraphs 3 of the Twitter news-sharing network. In particular, we distinguish those accounts that are highly followed and active in posting many links to news items from those that are not.
We expect to find a higher correlation between incoming and outgoing slant in the 'newscentric core' --the subgraph of individuals who are both highly followed and post many news items -than in subgraphs defined by the other three combinations of those two variables. People in the news-centric core may be maintaining a public identity centered around news, and so may connect with fewer people for reasons other than discussion of news. They may also engage in self-conscious management (Marwick and boyd, 2010) of their list of followees --to demonstrate party loyalty, for example --which would result in a higher correlation between incoming and outgoing slant.
In contrast to members of the news-centric core, those who are highly followed but do not post many links to news items are probably highly followed for other reasons, such as celebrity, and may not pay as much attention to the variable of political slant when choosing whom to follow. Those who post many links to news items but are not highly followed may well demonstrate homophily on political slant, but because they are less likely to be public figures, they may not be curating their followee list as self-consciously as members of the news-centric core. Finally those who are neither highly followed (among the individuals in our data comprising people who posted hyperlinks and their followers and followees) nor highly active posters of news may be less active users of Twitter, or actively using Twitter for other purposes, and thus are not expected to demonstrate less homophily on political slant than those in the news-centric core. Following the logic above and Wu, et al.'s (2011) observation that 'coreness' is not a binary but rather a continuous variable, we would expect that the higher the thresholds we use to separate individuals who are "highly followed" and "post many links to news" from everybody else (i.e. the stricter the definition of what constitutions the news-centric core), the higher the correlation will be among members of that core. 
Correspondence of macroscopic network structure and political slant
Earlier studies of political division on social media have shown a clear correspondence between the macroscopic structure of a network and the political slant of its nodes (Adamic and Glance, 2005; Conover et al, 2011) . In particular, this work shows that the network is starkly divided into two (one liberal and one conservative) modular clusters of nodes, such that nodes tend to be connected within each cluster, but only sparsely connected between clusters. By showing how cleanly political slant corresponds to network structure, these excellent studies lend strong support to the cyber-balkanization theory (Adamic and Glance, 2005) and polarization theory (Conover et al., 2011) , discussed above.
These studies are nevertheless limited in two important ways. First, both studies use only a binary, liberal v. conservative representation of slant, preventing more nuanced examination of homophily. Second, both studies only consider the behavior of elites and self-identified partisans (i.e. members of the news-centric core, whom we have just argued are not representative of the typical user) and thus shed no light on how social media works as a platform for discourse for the vast majority of users.
Because our data includes a continuous representation of political slant and includes all
Twitter users rather than only elites, we are able to address these two limitations. First, we are able to analyze the core separately from other users. Second, rather than consider classifications of nodes into two categories (liberal v. conservative), we focus instead on permutations of nodes defined either by political slant or other means.
A permutation is simply an ordering of the nodes of a network such each node is assigned an ordinal number from 1 to N (where N is the number of nodes in the network). Permutations can be defined by any number of means, but in the present context we will be particularly interested in permutations derived from the political slant variables: those in which the nodes are ordered from most liberal (and thus given the number 1) to the most conservative (and thus given the number N). A "good" permutation is one in which nodes that are close together in the network are close together in the ordering of nodes. In the following hypotheses (8a -8f), we compare the quality of permutations in this sense. Section 3.4.3, below, provides more concrete details on measurement of permutation quality.
Essentially, just as prior work showed that classifying nodes into liberal v. conservative was a good fit to the macroscopic division of the network into two distinct communities, we will ask if a continuous measure of political slant is a good one-dimensional description of network structure. We wish to ask this question for both incoming and outgoing slant and for the network core and network periphery. This involves making a number of comparisons among nodal permutations. First, to establish whether permutations based on incoming or outgoing slant are "good" descriptions of macroscopic network structure, we compare them to permutations derived from standard community discovery algorithms (see below). Second, since it is not a given that incoming slant and outgoing slant are equally closely related to network structure, we compare these two slant permutations to each other. Third, we repeat this process separately for the core and the periphery.
Accordingly, we test the following hypotheses comparing the quality of nodal permutations. First we compare incoming and outgoing slant for core and periphery.
Hypothesis 8a: An ordering of nodes in the news-centric core based on outgoing political slant is of equivalent quality to an ordering of those nodes based on incoming political slant

Hypothesis 8b: An ordering of nodes in the periphery based on outgoing political slant is of equivalent quality to an ordering of those nodes based on incoming political slant
Then, we compare incoming and outgoing slant to community discovery algorithms for the core.
Hypothesis 8c: An ordering of nodes in the news-centric core based on outgoing political slant is of equivalent quality to orderings of those nodes derived from communitydiscovery algorithms.
Hypothesis 8d: An ordering of nodes in the news-centric core based on incoming political slant is of equivalent quality to orderings of those nodes derived from community-discovery algorithms.
Finally, we compare incoming and outgoing slant to community discovery algorithms for the periphery.
Hypothesis 8e: An ordering of nodes in the periphery based on outgoing political slant is of equivalent quality to orderings of those nodes derived from community-discovery algorithms.
Hypothesis 8f: An ordering of nodes in the periphery based on incoming political slant is of equivalent quality to orderings of those nodes derived from community-discovery algorithms.
DATA AND METHODS
The Twitter Dataset
Our Twitter data comes from Galuba et al. (2010) , and contains 15 million unique URLs, tweeted by 2.7 million users. For 300 continuous hours, starting on Thursday, September 10th, 2009, 19:56:47 GMT, the Twitter Search API was continuously queried for the search string "http". The text of each tweet returned by the query was parsed for any URLs and user names it contained. Each URL mentioned in the tweets was stored. If the URL was created by one of the popular URL shortening services (e.g. bit.ly), HTTP redirects were recursively followed to expand the URL to its original form. All the URLs were also URL-decoded to ensure uniform representation under the percent-encoding (%xx) notation. For each tweet, the Twitter API was queried for the metadata about the tweet's author as well as all the users that the author follows.
Measurement of Political Slant
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) Using this data, they posit the model of utility of a visit to a website in equation 1. The utility is that of user i going to site j on visit k on a given day, given the site quality α, political slant γ, and dummy variable c set to 1 if visitor i is conservative and -1 if they are liberal (they omit data from individuals who answered "middle of the road").
They fit a Generalized Mixed Model to the visit data, under the discrete choice modeling assumption that the visit would be made if and only if u ijk ≥ u irk ∀r ≠ j. We use the estimated parameter γ as our measure of political slant. We also use α as a control variable indicating site quality. For the analysis, we use all tweets that contain any of the 119 domain URLs from Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) .
Although Plan Metrix data are only available for relatively large sites, visits to news sites are highly concentrated. The 119 sites in the sample represent over 95% of all visits to news sites via independent browsing online (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2011) , and given the greater expected concentration of exposure on social media than independent browsing (Hong, 2012) , the sample is expected to be even more completely representative for the setting of Twitter.
Variables
Individual level variables
For each user, we calculated mean incoming political slant (incoming slant) and mean outgoing source slant (outgoing slant). For the outgoing slant, we average the political slant of each URL source that the user tweeted. Incoming slant is the averaged slant score of every URL tweeted by the individuals whom a user follows (his/her followees). For both incoming and outgoing slant, if a news source was tweeted more than once, its slant score would be counted more than once in the average. Similarly, we calculate mean incoming (outgoing) quality for each individual from Gentzkow and Shapiro's α. Finally we tabulate the count (number) of incoming and outgoing tweets for each user. Note that we fit models on data for users that both sent and received tweets containing links to news sources; to calculate incoming slant, however, we consider tweets from all users, including those who did not receive any news links in their own timelines. The output of those twitter users who are widely followed but do not follow other accounts (typically public figures) is therefore still accounted for in the data.
To test Hypothesis 5, we estimate the empirical frequency distribution and probability density function of tweets across the domain of political slant present in our data, using a kernel density estimator, for both incoming and outgoing tweets.
Network variables
Using the Twitter data, we construct a follower-followee network. A directed network tie exists from user i to user j if user j is a follower of user i. From this data, we calculated aggregate clustering (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) , and assortativity on political slant (Newman, 2003) . The clustering coefficient captures the degree to which one's followers and followees also follow each other. More specifically, it is a measure of how many links there are among a node's neighbors, divided by the number of links that could exist among a node's neighbors.
Assortativity is analogous to a measure of correlation between two nodes having a link and having similar values on an attribute (political slant, in this case).
Statistical Models
We fit ordinary least squares (OLS) models to test Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, 4, and 6.
Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, and 6a and 6b are concerned with the relationship between the mean incoming slant and the mean outgoing slant, while Hypothesis 4 is concerned with the mediating influence of network clustering. (Newman, Strogatz and Watts, 2001 ) that preserve both the degree distribution and the joint distribution of outgoing slant and degree over individuals. We then calculate clustering and assortativity on these random graphs to form distributions of these values that would be found under the null hypothesis that there was no true tendency toward clustering or slant-based assortativity.
To test Hypothesis 5, we need to assess whether there are systematic differences in the ratio of tweets read to tweets received across the spectrum of political slant. To do this, we consider two regressions using the logarithm of the count of tweets sent divided by the logarithm of the count of tweets received as the outcome variable. In one regression, we use the mean outgoing slant as the predictor variable, to see if more politically central tweeters are more active.
In the other, we use the difference between mean incoming slant and mean outgoing slant as the predictor variable to test whether people tweeting more centrist material tweet more, even if they are not centrist in absolute terms.
Core-Periphery structure
Hypotheses 7a and 7b concern the difference between the behavior of people who are highly followed and post many news articles and other individuals. To test these, we select nodes that are greater than or equal to some threshold quantiles of outdegree and number of news stories posted, for s, t {0.75, 0.80, 0.85, 0.95}. We then consider the induced subgraph containing only those nodes that have outdegree greater than s% of nodes and have posted more news stories than t% of nodes in the full network. We then regress outgoing slant on incoming slant for only those tweets coming from within this subgraph and separately, for all tweets coming from any source using OLS and report the estimated parameter.
Concordance of community structure and slant
Hypotheses 8a-8f stipulate a concordance between the macroscopic community structure of the network and the political slant of the nodes. For these hypotheses, we are asking if permutations based on slant are good in the sense that nodes that are closely connected in the network are also close together in the permutation ordering. However, it is unclear a priori how to measure such correspondence between slant and structure, and then, how to determine if a given level of correspondence between slant and structure is a lot of correspondence or only a little. In other words, how good is good? .In order to test these hypotheses, we therefore (1) define a measure of permutation quality (2) use standard community-discovery algorithms from the literature to define permutations that represent network structure well and measure their quality, (3) measure the quality of permutations based on slant, and (4) define a significance test to determine if the quality of the slant-based permutations are significantly worse than the community-discovery algorithmic permutations.
Hypotheses 8a, 8c, and 8d concern the news-centric core, and hypotheses 8b, 8e and 8f concern those outside of the news-centric core. The "core" subgraph is defined as above, using nodes greater than or equal to some quantiles s, t of outdegree and news posting activity such that a regression of outgoing slant on incoming slant yields the highest estimated parameter.
Because of the computational expense of conducting these analyses on all ~213,000 nodes outside of the news-centric core using our methods, we test the latter hypotheses on a subgraph consisting only of moderate users. We define this subgraph as giant component of those accounts between the 25 th and 75 th percentiles for outdegree and less than the 75 th percentile for number of news items posted. This results in a subgraph of 75,640 Twitter accounts (a little more than one third of all news-active accounts), which omits the large number of least active and least followed accounts.
To measure quality of permutations, we start with the intuitions that connected nodes (those that follow each other) should be close together in a "good" permutation and that ties (matrix entries equal to 1) between nodes whose indices are close together in a given permutation will be close to the diagonal of the permuted adjacency matrix. Conversely, of course, ties between nodes that are far apart in the permutation will be far from the diagonal in the permuted adjacency matrix. We use these intuitions to define an idealized model against which to compare the observed permuted data such that we can evaluate them quantitatively.
We define the idealized model as a probability matrix, Z, such that matrix entries (network ties) closest to the diagonal are modeled as having probability 1, with linearly declining probability further from the diagonal. Note that this is not a fitted model, so the "probabilities"
are not estimated from the data; as an idealized model, the matrix of probabilities functions more as a "scoring matrix:" we calculate the likelihood of the idealized model, Z, under the observed permuted data in question.
Concretely,
(Highest probability closest to diagonal)
(Decreasing probability with distance from diagonal)
where i and j are row and column indices, respectively, and n is the number of nodes. To calculate the likelihood L p of Z under some permutated adjacency matrix, P, we simply take the Hadamard (pointwise) product of Z and P and take the sum of all the entries in the resulting matrix.
∑
The higher the likelihood, the more closely the permuted observed matrix adheres to the idealized model.
In addition to the permutations implicit in sorting the nodes according to their outgoing and incoming slants, we also consider two algorithmically-defined permutations deriving from the network structure (pattern of follower/followee ties) alone, rather than taking into account political slant or any other nodal attribute. Algorithmically defined permutations attempt to place nodes close together in the permutation ordering if they are close together in the network.
In the first of these, we follow the usual procedure of spectral clustering: we calculate the eigenvectors of the Laplacian matrix (a transformation of the adjacency matrix representation of the network) and then rank nodes according to the values in the eigenvector corresponding to one of the smallest eigenvalues not equal to zero 5 (see e.g. (Dhillon, 2001; Von Luxburg, 2007) for more detail). To find the smallest eigenvalues and corresponding eigenvectors of the "moderate user" subgraph, we use ARPACK numerical methods (Lehoucq, Sorensen, and Yang, 1998) , which are therefore approximate. In the second algorithmically-defined permutation, we use the method of Clauset, Newman and Moore (2004) , as implemented in the igraph analytical software package (Csardi and Nepusz, 2006) , which produces a full hierarchical dendrogram as a side effect of finding a smaller number of communities. We simply take the ordering of nodes at the bottom level of that dendrogram as our permutation.
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We visualize the difference between these four permutations of nodes (two by slant and two by community discovery algorithm) by plotting the adjacency matrix, with the rows and columns in permutation order for the core and moderate users subgraphs (Figures 1 and 2 ). On these plots, if rows are indexed by ,and columns are indexed by , then a point at location (i,j) on the visualization indicates that there exists a tie between node i and node j (account j follows account i on Twitter). The closer a permutation is to the idealized model, Z, the more the points in these plots will be concentrated toward the matrix diagonal.
It remains to determine how much higher a likelihood has to be to be considered significantly better than the likelihood of an alternative permutation of the observed matrix.
Typically, likelihoods are compared via likelihood ratio tests. Strictly speaking, however, likelihoods calculated from a matrix probability model on two different permutations of the same data are not nested, and thus the chi-squared limiting distribution on the traditional likelihood ratio test cannot be assumed. Instead, we calculate a critical value for distinguishing between the likelihoods of this model under these two permutations computationally.
We calculate the worst-case reduction of likelihood due to incorrect ordering for each of 5% of the total number of nodes and tabulate the reduction of likelihood that would occur if the edges incident to those nodes were moved as far away from the diagonal as possible. We repeat this procedure 1000 times and take the 95% percentile of the resulting distribution to be the 6 We grant that this permutation is based on a partial, rather than full ordering of nodes, since the first pair of nodes that are grouped together in a given branch of the dendrogram could appear in either order in the final permutation. However, since the number of such interchangeable pairs is small, and the distance that each node in these pairs could move in the permutation is at maximum 1 spot, we take the partial ordering output from the R function to be representative of the quality of all such possible permutations. critical value, greater than which we would consider two likelihoods different assuming a 5% type one error rate.
Descriptive Statistics
In our dataset, after processing and selecting those who both received and sent tweets containing links to the sources we covered, we were left with a group of 215,174 Twitter accounts that posted 27,127,798 tweets, of which 908,565 contained a hyperlink to one of the 119 news sources for which Gentzkow and Shapiro provide an estimated political slant. There were 14,870,199 follower-followee relationships among these accounts, and only 7177 accounts did not follow and were not followed by any of the other accounts that posted links to the 119 domains.
There were 165,624 accounts that had outgoing slant less than zero (liberal) and 49,550
accounts that had outgoing slant greater than zero (conservative). This is consistent with Pew's survey results, which indicate that liberals significantly more active on social media (Pew Research Center, 2012) . Descriptive statistics are in Table 1 and correlations are in Table 2 . We also tabulated the counts of users by mean incoming slant and mean outgoing slant. As Table 3 shows, we find that some people read tweets from the opposite side of the political spectrum from the side they tweet on themselves. 
RESULTS
Average behavior
We begin with results for average behavior of all individuals who tweeted a link to one of the sites covered by the Genztkow and Shapiro data. We report regression coefficients from OLS models in Table 4 . Most notably, the estimated parameter for the mean political slant of sites linked-to in incoming tweets was very stable at 0.6568 to 0.6720 in all models. Additional statistical results are mentioned in line with the text, below.
Echo Chambers
Hypotheses 1a and 1b are statements about homophily, operationalized as the correlation between the political slant in incoming versus outgoing tweets. Hypothesis 1a stipulates that there is a significant correlation between those quantities. As just mentioned above, we estimated a positive and significant regression parameter for this relationship across all models.
We do find homophily, and the hypothesis is therefore supported.
Hypothesis 1b makes a stronger statement about the relationship between incoming and outgoing slant, claiming that they are equal. If this hypothesis were true, we would expect the regression parameter to be equal to 1.0 (meaning the outgoing slant is equal to 1.0 times the incoming slant, and therefore equal). Given the standard errors of the estimated coefficients, this hypothesis is rejected: the outgoing slant is not equal to the incoming slant. The slant at which people tweet is correlated with but not equal to the slant of the material they receive. Hypothesis 1c says that the estimated parameter for incoming slant's effect on outgoing slant should be greater than one. Hypothesis 1c is therefore likewise rejected.
Hypothesis 2 is similar to Hypothesis 1a in its focus on homophily, but considers network ties to be the unit of analysis. Specifically, it states that individuals are more likely to follow and be followed by people with similar politics, as measured by political-slant based assortativity.
We found an observed assortativity of 0.1624 and calculated a mean assortativity of 1000 null models (described above) of -2.767x10 -6 , with a standard deviation of 0.0003. The frequentist probability of the observed assortativity being drawn from the null distribution is less than one tenth of one percent, and thus we reject the null and support hypothesis 2. There is a significant assortativity based on political slant.
Hypothesis 3 states that there is a statistically significant tendency toward network clustering, that is, that the people whom an individual follows and is followed by are likely to also follow each other. We found an empirical aggregate level of clustering equal to 0.1083 and calculated a mean clustering of 1000 configuration models equal to 0.0863 with a standard deviation of 0.0002. The observed level of clustering is greater than that expected by chance, with the probability of the observed value being drawn from the null distribution being less than one tenth of one percent. We thus fail to reject Hypothesis 3. Like most social networks, there is a statistically significant tendency to clustering over and above what we would expect by chance when we hold the degree distribution constant.
Hypothesis 4 speaks to the notion that clustering is associated with "echo chambers" in social media. It is intended to represent the notion that people in clustered positions (those whose followers and followees also follow each other), may be even more likely than those in unclustered positions to tweet at a similar political slant to their network neighbors. Table 4 , model 4 reports a regression coefficient of 0.0585 for clustering. Therefore we fail to reject Hypothesis 4, as we do find evidence that people in positions of high clustering tweet more similarly to the people they follow than people in positions of low clustering. However, we must note that the effect of clustering, while statistically significant, is not of great magnitude. A onestandard deviation increase in clustering coefficient would only result in a predicted increase in outgoing slant from 0.6721 times the incoming slant to 0.6789 times the incoming slant.
Mainstreaming
Our mainstreaming theory states that people are less likely to voice opinions that they perceive are not widely held. Hypothesis 5a operationalizes this theory as a claim that individuals on either end of the political spectrum (far away from the political center) will tweet fewer times per person than those in the political center. Hypothesis 5b says that people on either end of the spectrum will tweet less for each tweet they receive; those at the political center will tweet at the highest rate per tweet they receive. Our evidence on these hypotheses is mixed.
For Hypothesis 5a, we do not find evidence of more tweets by centrist accounts. Rather, we find a slightly higher rate of tweeting by more conservative accounts. For Hypothesis 5b, we do find that accounts that tweet at an outgoing slant of -0.15 (between the sample mean of -0.23 and the political center, 0.0) tweet slightly more on average per tweet that they receive than more politically distal Twitter accounts. We also find that accounts that tweet more centrally than the mean slant of their followees tweet more times per tweet received. However, despite the vanishingly small p-values for the estimated parameters in these regressions, the effect magnitudes and the R 2 s are also tiny for tests of both hypotheses. Therefore, we reject Hypothesis 5a and accept Hypothesis 5b but only trivially, and we do not report the parameter estimates here.
Hypothesis 6a returns to the relationship between incoming and outgoing political slant and stipulates that people tend to tweet more centrist material than the material they read in their own newsfeeds. Hypothesis 6b is much stronger and stipulates that the average Twitter user tweets at the same level of slant as the mean of the whole population. As already stated, the estimated coefficient from Table 4 was 0.67, which is statistically significantly less than 1, and greater than 0. In other words, hypothesis 6a is supported and 6b is rejected. Overall, Twitter accounts do tend to tweet more centrist material than the material posted by the accounts they follow, but not necessarily at or near the political mean of the population.
Beyond average behavior: macroscopic and subnetwork analyses 4.2.1 Core-periphery structure
Hypotheses 7a and 7b concern a core of highly followed users who are active in posting links to news stories. Hypothesis 7a states that the correlation between incoming slant and outgoing slant is stronger within the core, and hypothesis 7b states that the higher the standards used to define the core, the more similar outgoing slant will be to incoming slant. Tables 5, 6 , and 7 summarize evidence relevant to these hypotheses: the estimated parameter for the effect of incoming slant on outgoing slant is reported for different definitions of the core with respect to both outdegree and news posting activity. When we consider only those tweets from inside the core, the maximum parameter estimate that we find is 1.0863; when we consider all tweets from all sources, we find an even higher parameter: 1.1723. Given our previous results on the centrist tendencies of the majority of users, this difference in parameters is expected.
All specifications we tested for the core yielded a higher parameter for the effect of incoming slant on outgoing slant than the one we found in our study of the whole population (Table 4) ; we thus fail to reject Hypothesis 7a.
As for Hypothesis 7b, there is a clear pattern evident in Tables 5 and 6 : the more restrictive the definition of the core, the higher the estimated effect of incoming slant on outgoing slant. In both tables, the higher the quantile of degree used as a threshold for core membership, the greater the estimated parameter. The magnitude of the effect of raising the quantile threshold of news posting activity is smaller than that for degree and in Table 5 is generally highest at the 90 th quantile of news posting in each column, except the last column, corresponding to the strictest definition of the core. In this right-most column of both tables, the maximum parameter estimate is found when we define the core as consisting only of those individuals who are above the 95 th percentile for both outdegree and number of news items posted. We therefore cannot reject hypothesis 7b: the stricter the definition of what constitutes the news-centric core, the greater is the effect of incoming slant on outgoing slant. † the logarithm of the number of followers/ees plus 2 is taken to avoid dividing by zero for those with no followees. Tables 5 and 6 show that the more restrictive the definition of the network core, the higher the parameter estimate for the estimate of the relationship between incoming slant and outgoing slant. For moderately restrictive definitions of the network core (for example, those accounts with greater than the 85 th percentile of outdegree and 90 th percentile of news items posted in Table 5 ) the parameter estimates for incoming slant are not significantly different from 1.0. We therefore would not be able to reject Hypothesis 1b -that the mean political slant of news sources in tweets by individuals is statistically indistinguishable from the mean political slant of the tweets that they receive from the people they follow -for the news-centric core thus defined. However, for the most restrictive definitions of the core the average outgoing slant is in fact more extreme than the average incoming slant, indicating not so much echo chambers, in which we would expect people to be reading and tweeting at the same political slant, but rather a tendency to polarization, in which we see people reading more centrist material on average than what they tweet themselves.
Polarization in the core
What emerges is a more nuanced picture of the whole. The vast majority of Twitter accounts that post news items do not post many of them, have a moderate number of followers among other news-posting accounts, and tend to post news items from more centrist sources than what they read themselves. On the other hand, a small minority of Twitter accounts constituting the network core post relatively many news from more politically polarized news sources than those in their own news feeds. This is not to say that the core only posts material from the political extremes or that the periphery only post centrist material, simply that on average the core posts more extreme material and the periphery posts more centrist material than the accounts they follow. Our results also do not support the extrapolation that the centrist tendency of accounts in the periphery is due to a tendency of following more extreme accounts in the core. We regressed outgoing slant on incoming slant after excluding core accounts and the tweets originating from those accounts (in the manner of Table 5 , but for the periphery rather than for the core). After thus removing the effects of the core from the periphery, the estimated parameter for incoming slant's effect on outgoing slant was 0.7030, only slightly higher than the estimate for the complete data. 
Correspondence of community structure and political slant
Is the Twitter follower network organized according to the political slant of its nodes?
Here we make several comparisons between permutations of nodes based on slant to those deriving from the patterns of ties alone using community discovery algorithms. Figures 1 and 2 visualize the adjacency matrix of the core and typical users subgraph according to the spectral and slant permutations of the nodes. The following paragraphs quantify these comparisons.
Core permutations
Section 3.4.3, above, describes the matrix probability model of which we calculate the likelihood on the spectral and slant partitions. In short, the likelihood of this model is calculated by pointwise multiplication of Z (see above) with some permuted adjacency matrix P and will be high to the extent that a given permutation concentrates tie weight toward the diagonal of a matrix. Critical values for differences in likelihoods were determined computationally.
The likelihoods of the diagonal gradient model under the four permutations of the core subgraph are presented in Table 8 . Critical values are also given, which represent the 95 th percentile of likelihood reduction expected when 5% of nodes are removed from their proper place in the permutation and placed in a worst-fit location in the permutation. Strikingly, the outgoing slant permutation is a much poorer fit to the diagonal gradient model than any of the other three permutations, and indeed the likelihood of Z given the outgoing slant permutation is significantly less than the other three according to our critical values, leading us to reject Hypothesis 8c. The incoming slant permutation is a better representation of the whole network than the outgoing slant permutation in the sense that nodes that are close together in the incoming slant permutation tend to be more closely connected in the network than nodes that are close together in the outgoing slant permutation are. We therefore reject Hypothesis 8a. Additionally, for the core, the likelihood of the incoming slant permutation is not less than the likelihoods of the Clauset, Newman and Moore (2004) and Laplacian eigenvector-based permutations, minus their critical values. We fail to reject Hypothesis 8d and find incoming slant to be an equivalently good description of network structure as standard community discovery algorithms. The likelihood of the diagonal gradient model under the four permutations of the "moderate users" subgraph is presented in Table 8 . Like the results for the core, this subgraph yields the highest likelihood under the Clauset, Newman and Moore (2004) permutation, followed by the spectral permutation, the incoming slant permutation and the outgoing slant permutation. However, although the order of results is the same, we draw different conclusions as follows. The outgoing slant permutation is not significantly worse than the incoming slant permutation given our definition of significance based on the critical value. We therefore fail to reject hypothesis 8b: incoming and outgoing slant are equivalently good descriptions of network structure for moderate users in the periphery. Additionally, both of the slant permutations are worse than the likelihood minus the critical value for both of the community discovery algorithms. We therefore reject Hypotheses 8e and 8f: community discovery algorithms produce better descriptions of network structure than either incoming or outgoing political slant.
Typical users subgraph permutation and classification
A summary of hypothesis test outcomes is presented in Table 10 . 4: clustering increases effect of inslant on outslant * (trivially) Hypothesis 5: Higher rate of tweeting at political center 5a: #sent highest at political center 5b: #sent ÷ #received highest at political center * (trivially) Hypothesis 6: Tendency to centrism 6a: outslant more centrist than inslant * 6b: individual outslant = population mean outslant Hypothesis 7: Members of core are less centrist 7a: effect of inslant higher for members of the core * 7b: stricter definition of core  higher effect of inslant on outslant * Hypothesis 8: political slant is a good summary of network structure 8a: outgoing slant permutation ~ incoming slant permutation (core) (incoming better) 8b: outgoing slant permutation ~ incoming slant permutation (non-core) * 8c: outgoing slant permutation ~ community discovery alg. Permutations (core) (algo better) 8d: incoming slant permutation ~ community discovery alg. permutations (core) * 8e: outgoing slant permutation ~ community discovery alg. Permutations (noncore) (algo better) 8f: incoming slant permutation ~ community discovery alg. Permutations (noncore) (algo better)
Notes: "*" indicates the null hypothesis was rejected, and evidence was found for the stated alternative hypothesis. "~" indicates that the quality of one permutation is equivalent to the quality of the other permutation 
DISCUSSION
Summary of empirical findings
Overall, our results are only partially consistent with theories of echo chambers, polarization and mainstreaming. Although small echo chambers may exist, we do not see clear evidence for them in the aggregate. We do find evidence of homophily (outgoing slant is correlated with incoming slant), but also an average tendency to moderation and many points of contact among different points on the political spectrum (see slant-permuted matrices in Figures   1 and 2) . We do see a polarized and active core in which network structure closely corresponds to political slant, but we also see a much larger (albeit much less active) generally moderating majority for which network structure is more weakly related to slant. .: Summary diagram of connectivity patterns, distinguishing core from periphery. Overall, there is a tendency to centrism, but a majority of tweets received originate in the network core, which has a tendency to polarization. Grey circles represent accounts in the network core and periphery. Circle size is proportionate to number of accounts. Arrows indicate percentage of total connectivity within and between core and periphery. A: arrow size is proportional to total number of follower-followee relationships in the full data set and labeled with a percentage (e.g. 79.8% of all links are within the periphery). B: arrow size is proportional to (an upper bound on) the number of tweets received in the full data set, calculated as number of tweets sent multiplied by the number of news-active followers (accounts that sent at least one link to a news site) that those tweets were sent to (e.g. only 33.5% of all tweets received were both sent and received by accounts in the periphery).
A diagrammatic summary of the overall communication structure is in Figure 3 . The widespread concern over polarization may be due to the over-representation of tweets originating in the core, constituting a sort of network paradox (Feld, 1991) . As for mainstreaming, we do not find an absolute, but rather a relative tendency to political centrism. We also note that accounts outside of the core are tweeting across the political spectrum, which undermines a literal theory of a spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1974).
Broader implications
What is read versus what is said
In cross section, we find that communication patterns look very different when one looks at what is read (incoming information) instead of what is said (outgoing information). Because incoming slant is more closely related to network structure than outgoing slant, in one limited sense we can conclude that what is read is the more meaningful measure. This may have substantial consequences for our understanding of influence in social networks, which typically only looks at expressed behavior (analogous to what is said in the context of this study). For example, in a network study of influence in the spread of a product, an individual's social media posts about that product could be interpreted as an expression of interest in the product or as the outward expression of desire to conform without any true interest in the product.
Additionally, we find that the relationship between what is read and what is said is strikingly different in the network core from outside of it: core accounts tend to position themselves in a more extreme position that what they are exposed to, while the typical account positions itself in a more moderate position. In the setting of influence in networks, it could well turn out that there is a similar regularity such that those within a core systematically express their preferences in an extreme manner, while those outside of the core systematically express their preferences in a moderate and dampened manner.
Because of this marked heterogeneity between core and periphery, it is necessary to study communicating systems as a whole as we seek to understand the technologically mediated crowd that is of increasing importance in our evolving economy and society.
The core versus the periphery in online communities: the "multiplex public"
Like other social networks, online communities have a core-periphery structure (Dahlander and Fredriksen, 2012; Collier and Kraut, 2012; Wasko, Teigland and Faraj, 2009) and are composed of individuals with shared goals and interests that communicate over the internet (Preece, 2000) , in a self-organized manner consisting of voluntary participation and without formal organization (Dahlander and O'Mahoney, 2011) . Our data could therefore be considered an online community of political discussion with liberal and conservative subcommunities, or alternatively, two overlapping communities in conflict with each other.
In general, prior research has treated membership in the core versus the periphery as essentially an issue of the level of engagement in the community. Some attention has been paid to how individuals end up in the core (Collier and Kraut, 2012; Dahlander and O'Mahoney, 2011; Johnson, Safadi and Faraj, 2015) , and the sources of motivation for "heavy weight" participants in the core compared to "light weight" participants in the periphery of an online community (Haythornthwaite, 2009 ). Our results, however, reveal that those in the periphery are not only different from those in the core in terms of the amount of participation or reason for participation in the community, but indeed also in terms of the very nature of their information sharing behavior. Again, we find that on average, core members share links to more politically extreme news sources than the links they receive in their own timelines. Periphery members, on the other hand, are the opposite.
People tend to express themselves freely to the extent that the topic of conversation is consistent with their public or professional identity, and that their audience is homogenous (Marwick and boyd, 2010) . For most people these conditions do not apply, since they use a personal (rather than professional or other narrowly constructed public identity) social media account to connect to multiple contexts and identities (Rainie and Wellman, 2012; Hampton, Lee and Her, 2011; Marwick and Boyd, 2010) . In other words, most people cannot assume that their followers also follow each other, which accords with the fact that the periphery of a social network is not highly interconnected within itself by definition (Borgatti and Everett, 2000) . For people who both have a clear public identity and surround themselves with others with shared interests and goals -in other words, for members of the core -Marwick and boyd's conditions for free expression are met. This free expression could then be amplified by social influence (Centola and Macy, 2007; Shore, Bernstein and Lazer, 2015) and made more extreme by group polarization processes (Sunstein, 2002) .
If individuals in the core and the periphery have different characteristic behaviors and social environments, then lumping them together under the single term "community" is insufficient. Instead, a new term is needed to describe this social structure that is most pervasive in our data. We offer the term "multiplex public" to describe the social structure that such typical users of social networking services inhabit. "Multiplex" refers to the multiple network layers (a work network, a school network, a friend network and so on) that come together to form the overall follower-followee network, and "public" emphasizes the environment that is neither a single cohesive community nor a disconnected crowd, but in which individuals are still visible to sparsely-connected others.
We suggest that this multiplex public has received less attention in the past in part because it has not been an obvious source of peer production. Because of their economic consequence, online communities and crowds have been obvious and important to researchers in and around the disciplines of management. Now, as data science uses digital traces for all manner of social scientific and business intelligence purposes, we should also acknowledge the significance of this prominent social structure and identify they ways it diverges from cohesive groups and network cores in future research.
Research methods
Network research nearly always faces a boundary definition problem (Laumann, Marsden and Prensky, 1989) : the researcher must define who is in and who is out of the research data. As a matter of convenience, this often means selecting nodes on the basis of their activity; in the case of political slant, prior work has sampled people to study on the basis of their obvious political partisanship (Adamic and Glance, 2005; Conover, et al, 2011; Bakshy, Messing and Adamic, 2015; Barbera et al.,2015) . While all of these studies go to some lengths to account for their data collection strategy, at a certain level they cannot fully escape the fundamental limitations that come with sampling on the dependent variable. That partisans are polarized does not imply that social media users in general are polarized.
The implications for future research on social media are clear: the behavior of members of the core is not representative of people outside of the core. Networks constructed by choosing obviously relevant individuals (because they post a lot about the research topic, for example) are likely to consist only of the network core and leave out the more representative (in terms of ordinary users) periphery.
Limitations
Although our data is broadly representative in terms of its inclusion of typical Twitter users, our coverage consists of a cross-section in a non-election year. This means that we cannot speak to issues of influence or other dynamic processes on or of networks -only the crosssectional organization of Twitter. More importantly, however, is the fact that our data was collected from a relatively "typical" period of time: 2009 was not an election year and September 10 th -23 rd (the data collection window) did not contain any major news stories 7 that might spark an increase in partisan conflict. If the data were collected at an atypically polarized time, we may have observed different results. Finally, Twitter was 3 years old when the data were collected, so while it no longer was only the home of early adopters, it had not yet gained the reach and user base that it has today. It is impossible to say for certain how this might affect results if this study could be repeated with current data.
A second set of limitations comes with our use of Gentzkow and Shapiro's slant scores.
Although they cover over 95% of all direct news browsing and an even higher percentage of exposure to news on social media, we do not cover all sources of news. We cannot rule out the possibility that there are echo chambers built around the sharing of news from sites representing a tiny minority of news exposures, including those from hate sites. Indeed, if there were a total absence of such phenomena at the fringe, it would be surprising. However, this doesn't affect our results, which characterize the vast majority of news exposures on Twitter. Finally, we study sharing and receiving links to news sites, so our data do not cover other types of speech; it is 7 See http://www.infoplease.com/year/2009.html#us possible, for example, that free text tweets follow different patterns than those we observe here in shares of news content.
Conclusion
By using data representative of the whole population of Twitter users, we were able to reconcile apparently contradictory theories of diversity of information sharing on Twitter. The aggregate picture cannot be described as just a collection of echo chambers on the one hand, or a clear pattern of mainstreaming on the other. Rather, with elements of both tendencies, we instead see a whole system comprising a vast moderating majority -a multiplex public -with a polarized two-part community at its core. Predicted behavior depends on which part of the system you are looking at, but on average, Twitter accounts post more centrist information than they receive in their own timelines, undercutting the prevailing narrative of the social media echo chamber. Instead, the widespread perception of such polarization may be the result of a network paradox, in which the behavior of nodes with a high degree is mistaken to be typical (Feld, 1991) .
